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ENSURING THE CREDIBILITY OF UNITED
STATES FOOD AID: PROPOSALS FOR
INSULATING THE FOOD SECURITY WHEAT
RESERVE FROM ECONOMIC INFLUENCES
Food security has increasingly become a global and Congressional
concern in recent decades. I The concern peaked after a famine and world
wide food shortage in the early 1970's. The crisis prompted a 130-nation
World Food Conference in 1974.2 The conference declared: "Every man,
woman and child has the inalienable right to be free from hunger and
malnutrition in order to develop fully and maintain their physical and
mental facilities. . . . [T]he eradication of hunger is a common objective
of all the countries of the international community . . . . "3 The con-
ference resolved to eradicate malnutrition caused by hunger by 1985. 4
The food shortage also demonstrated a potentially fatal weakness in the
United States' own food aid program, commonly known as P.L. 480 or
the "Food for Peace" program.5 A statutory provision necessitated the
1. See H.R. REP. No. 966 pt. 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.]. For
a brief historical perspective on world hunger, see Nanda, The WorldFood Crisis and the Role ofLaw in
Combating Hunger and Malnutrition, 10 J. Ib"'L L. & EcON. 725, 732-41 (1975).
2. The conference was sponsored by the United Nations and was held in Rome.
3. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL POLICY OFTHE SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE
AND FOREsTRY, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., HUNGER AND DIPLOMACY: A PERSPECrIVE ON THE U.S. ROLE AT
THE WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE 60 (Comm. Print 1975). A report of the conference may also be found in
11 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON. at 59 (Dec. 1974).
4. H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 2. Economists and nutrition specialists differ widely on the
measurement of malnutrition. C. ZUVEKAS, JR., ECONOMIC DEvELOPMENT: AN INTRODUCTION 172
(1979). Average daily caloric intake, daily protein consumption, and body weight are commonly used
indicators. Id. at 172; see also N. Crimshaw & L. Taylor, Food, reprinted in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
26-36 (1980). However, it is difficult to accurately obtain these measurements for enough individuals to
assess the level of malnutrition in a given population. The infant mortality rate, which is simpler to
determine, has been suggested as the most accurate indicator of development. J. GRANT, THE STATE OF
THE WORLD'S CHILDREN: 1984 at 6 (1984). One study found that 67% of deaths in infancy (under one
year) and early childhood (one to four years of age) are associated with malnutrition ormalnourishment.
C. ZuvEKAs, supra, at 171.
Disagreement also exists as to the extent of malnutriton in the developing world, perhaps due to the
disagreement on measurement. Id. at 173. 1970's measures of the percentage of the world population
inflicted with malnutrition range from one half the population to one sixth. Id. at 173. The 1984 infant
mortality rate for less developed countries excluding China was 107 per 1000, compared to 19 per 1000
for more developed countries. POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, INc., 1984 World Population Data
Sheet (1984). Under any formula, the World Food Conference goal can hardly be considered accom-
plished in light of the current Ethiopian famine.
5. Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, ch. 469, 68 Stat. 454 (1954)
(codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1736e (1982)); Food for Peace Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-808, § 3(c),
80 Stat. 1526 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1427, 1431, 1431b, 1446a-7, 1691-1736e (1982)). For a brief
explanation of the statutory framework and administration of P.L. 480, see Walczak, New Directions in
United States Food Aid: Human Rights and Economic Development, 8 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 543,
597
Washington Law Review Vol. 61:597, 1986
reduction of food aid shipments during the early 1970's when the aid was
most needed to alleviate the famine. 6 Congress responded by creating an
emergency wheat reserve in order to ensure food security.7 The legislation
creating the reserve strictly prohibits the use of the wheat for any purposes
other than urgent humanitarian food aid under Title II of P.L. 480 ("Title
II").8 This restriction was enacted not only in the interest of food security,
but also to protect the American farmer from depressed prices resulting
from release of large quantities of wheat onto the market. 9
However, the inadequacy of the prohibition was demonstrated when
Congress enacted legislation which allowed the reserve to be used for
purposes other than urgent humanitarian food aid. 10 It then became clear
that a legislative prohibition alone would not be sufficient to insulate the
reserve from the economic influences which might pressure the govern-
ment into tampering with it. Instead, Congress must create a private
remedy that entitles members of the agricultural community to monetary
545-46 (1979); Nanda, supra note I, at 738-41; Note, Public Law 480, American Agriculture and
World Food Demand, 10 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 739-60 (1978).
6. A protective provision cripples the food aid process when certain domestic economic conditions
exist. See Walczak, supra note 5, at 567; Food Security Act of 1979, Joint Hearing on H.R. 4489 Before
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the House Comm. on Agriculture, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Joint Hearing]. Under P.L. 480, grain is purchased on the domestic market
and shipped overseas to less developed countries. 7 U.S.C. § 1721 (1982). Section 401(a) of P.L. 480
prohibits the disposition of grain for food aid if the Secretary of Agriculture determines that the
domestic supply of grain is inadequate for domestic demand, export demand or carryover needs. 7
U.S.C. § 1731(a) (1982).
Export demand escalated during the food crisis because developed foreign countries found it
increasingly difficult to meet their own domestic demand and turned to the United States to purchase
grain. As this export demand increased, the domestic supply became too low under § 401(a), and food
aid exports correspondingly decreased at exactly the time that they were critically needed in less
developed countries. The total aid shipments dropped from 9.9 million tons in 1972 to 3.3 million tons
in 1974. Wheat shipments dropped from 6.5 million tons in 1972 to 1.4 million tons in 1974. H.R. REP.
No. 966 pt. 2, 96th Cong., 2d Sess 4 (1980) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. pt. 21. See also Joint
Hearing, supra, at 3-4, 42, 53-54; Walczak, supra note 5, at 567, 569-70; H.R. REP., supra note 1, at
2-3, 5; Steiner, Foreword to P. TREAZISE, REBUILDING GRAIN RESERVES at (vii) (1976).
Ironically, then, § 401(a) had the effect of extinguishing the United States' ability to give food aid
when it was most needed to save lives, and causing the United States to lose credibility with less
developed countries. Joint Hearing, supra note 6, at 4; Walczak, supra note 5, at 567. See also Note,
supra note 5, at 758.
7. See infra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
8. Title II of P.L. 480 permits the shipment of food aid on a donation basis. P.L. 480 consists of
three titles. Title I authorizes the United States to enter transactions with less developed countries in
which the United States transfers grain to a foreign government which sells the grain and uses the
proceeds for development projects. The foreign government incurs a long-term debt. Title II authorizes
the donation of grain for feeding programs. Title III is the same as Title I, except that the foreign
government does not incur a debt. For a clear comparison of the three titles of P.L. 480, see Walczak,
supra note 5, at 547-65.
9. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
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relief, is constitutionally protected, and cannot be extinguished by subse-
quent congressional action without compensation. Such a private remedy
would deter"1 the government from making a non-food aid use because it
would have to pay for such a use.
This Comment proposes and evaluates two amendments to the legisla-
tion governing the emergency reserve that would help insulate the reserve
from the market. 12 Insulation can be accomplished by creating and protect-
ing certain contract rights of the farmer/vendor 3 against the United States
government. The farmer could enforce those rights if the government
released the reserve for purposes other than urgent humanitarian food aid.
The Appendix contains proposed legislation which creates and protects
such remedies. These proposals should contribute positively to public
policy debate over methods of ensuring world food security. However, this
Comment considers only the legal viability, not the political ramifications,
of the remedies. 14 Although this Comment concludes that it is possible to
create a legal scheme to effectively insulate the reserve, and recommends
one proposal over the other, policy judgments are left to those in a better
position to make them.
11. For the purposes of this Comment, deterrence is defined as discouraging another party from
taking action by presenting the prospect of a cost or risk which outweighs prospective gain. See G.
SNYDER, DETERRENCE AND DEFENsE 3 (1961). The effectiveness of deterrence depends on four factors:
(1) the importance of the objectives of the party to be discouraged; (2) the cost the party expects to incur
as the result of the possible responses; (3) the probability of each such response; and (4) the probability
of still obtaining the objectives in light of each possible response. See id. at 12-13. At least with respect
to crime, empirical studies show that changes in opportunity costs do have an impact on the effective-
ness of deterrence, suggesting that Snyder's factors may be accurate. R. PosNE, ECONOMIC ANAYsiS
OF LAW 164-65 (2d ed. 1977).
12. "Insulate" is used in a legal, not economic, sense. "Insulating" the reserve from the market
means providing legal remedies that ensure that the reserve will not be released for purposes other than
food aid. In economic terms, to "insulate" a reserve from the market would mean to ignore the reserve
in the calculation of available grain supply so that it will not influence market behavior. The theory is
that if no transfer occurs between the reserve and the market, the reserve cannot influence price
behavior. COMPTrOLLER GEN ., U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFicE, GRAIN REsEvs: A PoTEwrmiL U.S.
FOOD PoucY TOOL 31 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT]. Indeed, Congress has stipulated that
the reserve not be considered part of the available wheat supply for the purposes of other laws. Food
Security Wheat Reserve Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-494, tit. III, § 302, 94 Stat. 2578 (codified at 7
U.S.C. § 1736f-l(f) (1982)). It is impossible, however, to effectively insulate a reserve in the economic
sense. All reserves release grain subject to specific operational rules which make it easy for market
participants to anticipate the releases and adjust their market behavior accordingly. GAO RPoRT,
supra, at 31.
13. For the purposes of this Comment, "farmer" refers to any entity that sells wheat to the
government for the purposes of the wheat reserve. This includes producers, since the government may
also purchase grain from producers. 7 U.S.C. § 1736f-l(b)(2) (1982).
14. One political problem is the possible reluctance of Congress to tie its own hands by committing
the government to pay for certain uses of the wheat, and in addition, reluctance to make appropriations
to replenish the reserve where use of the grain would be restricted.
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I. BACKGROUND
In 1980, Congress acted to ensure adequate food aid during future
famines and grain shortages. The Food Security Wheat Reserve Act of
198015 authorized the creation of a wheat reserve of up to four million
metric tons as a backstop to Title II. 16 The purpose of the Act is to preserve
15. 7 U.S.C. § 1736f-1 (1982). A complete explanation of the Act may be found in H.R. REP.,
supra note 1, at 10-17.
Although Congress first considered the establishment of an international reserve, all its efforts to
create one have failed. The creation of an international reserve was a major proposal of the November,
1974 World Food Conference. Res. XVII, Report of the World Food Conf., U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 65/20
14-15 (1975). The House of Representatives responded to the conference proposal the following
December by adopting a resolution concerning world hunger and recommending the establishment of
international reserves. H.R. Res. 1399, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). Subsequent Congresses expressed
a similar desire to create an international reserve system. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 95-426, Title VI,
§ 604(a), 92 Stat. 986 (1978) (Congress encourages the President to enter negotiations in order to
develop an international system of reserves). See also H.R. 9045, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); H.R.
11,439, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977). Both bills concerned creation of international reserves. The first
bill had nearly 100 cosponsors. H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 2.
Although a 500,000 ton International Emergency Food Reserve was established under the U.N.
World Food Program in 1975, the negotiations forestablishing an international system of reserves under
the Wheat Trade Convention of the International Wheat Agreement have repeatedly failed. Coats,
Gabanyu & Scommenga, World Food Security, BREAD FOR THE WORLD BACKGROUND PAPER No. 57 at
3-4 (Feb. 1982). See also Walczak, supra note 5, at 566-70. The Carter Administration's proposal for
the creation of an International Emergency Wheat Reserve has also failed, Walczak, supra note 5, at
570, despite Congress' expression of intent that the President enter negotiations to create such a reserve.
H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 2.
Legislative history of the United States' proposal to establish an international system of grain
reserves under the International Wheat Agreement may be found in STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL GRAIN RESERVES SYSTEM, 94TH
CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON THE SEPT. 29-30, 1975, MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHEAT COUNCIL
PREPARATORY GROUP (Comm. Print 1975); STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THE
U.S. PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL GRAIN RESERVES SYSTEM-II, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT
ON THE SEPT. 28-Ocr. 3, 1977, MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHEAT COUNCIL PREPARATORY GROUP
(Comm. Print 1977).
16. 7 U.S.C. § 1736f-l(a) (1982). Congress chose to store wheat because it is less costly to store
and acquire than other processed foods, it is easily substituted for other coarse grains, it is the most
widely traded grain worldwide, and it is the largest part of P.L. 480 programming. H.R. REP., supra
note 1, at 10; International Emergency Wheat Reserve: Joint Hearings Before the House Comm. on Int'l
Relations and House Comm. on Agriculture, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
International Emergency Wheat Reserve]. In addition, the Secretary of Agriculture testified at the
House Hearings that wheat has the highest nutritive value relative to cost. Joint Hearing, supra note 6,
at 4. The choice of wheat was also probably influenced by the Soviet grain embargo. The Food Security
Wheat Reserve proposal was part of the bill designed to alleviate adverse effects of the trade suspension
with the Soviet Union, and the bill was reported in the Senate Hearings along with other bills designed
to mitigate the effects of the embargo. See Emergency Agricultural Act of 1980: Hearings on S. 2258
Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 174-76 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
Congress should reconsider the decision to store only wheat in the reserve. Although different
recognized forms of starvation require different nutritive supplements, the nutrients all famine victims
need most are proteins, followed by calories. Wheat and rice are excellent sources of protein and are the
best for emergency feeding programs. Soy and lentils also provide satisfactory levels of protein. In
600
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the credibility of the United States' commitment to alleviating hunger by
guaranteeing the availability of aid during times of limited domestic sup-
ply. 17 The Food Security Wheat Reserve was initially established through a
transfer of grain from surplus stocks of the Commodity Credit Corporation
("CCC").18 The Act contemplates replenishment of old wheat through
similar CCC transfers and purchases from producers or the market. 19 It also
provides that the grain may be released by the President only for Title II
purposes and only under one of two circumstances: (1) where the domestic
supply of wheat is insufficient to meet domestic demand, export demand,
addition, soy proteins are especially good for infants. Interview with Jim Owens, M.D. (19 March,
1985) (notes on file with the WashingtonLawReview) (Dr. Owens is an expert inrelief medicine, having
participated in relief efforts in Thailand, Cambodia, Somalia, Lebanon, and most recently, Ethiopia.
Seattle Times-Post Intelligencer, March 17, 1985, at B16, col. 4). Unprocessedrice is the best food for
relief efforts in Asia, because it is difficult to successfully introduce wheat into the diets of persons in
rice-eating countries, and because famine victims fed on processed rice develop beriberi. Owens
interview, supra.
Congress may also want to reconsider the size of the reserve. It orginally considered sizes ranging
from two million metric tons to six million. International Emergency WheatReserve, supra, at22. This
quantity may not be adequate to meet another global disaster. The size recommended for the ill-fated
international reserve, see supra note 15, was 60 million tons, P. TREZISE, supra note 6, at 58, which far
exceeds the amount held in the domestic reserve. Congress should also consider establishing a
minimum amount for the reserve. The current legislation only requires stocks of up to four million
metric tons. 7 U.S.C. § 1736f-l(a) (1982).
17. 7 U.S.C. § 1736f-l(a) (1982). See also id. §§ 1736f-l(c) to 1736f-l(d) (the reserve can only be
released for relief purposes).
In both purpose and operation, the reserve has been compared to the reserve Joseph established in the
Genesis story. See International Emergency Wheat Reserve, supra note 16, at 60-61 (1978); Bread for
the World, June 1983, at 2, col. 2; Genesis 41. The reserve is stocked with purchases from the market
only when the supply is ample enough that the market would not be unduly disrupted, 7 U.S.C.
§ 1736f-l(b)(2) (1982), and released only to meet famine or other extraordinary relief requirements. Id.
§ 1736f-l(d).
Furthermore, as an emergency reserve, this reserve is distinct from the farmer-held price-stabiliza-
tion reserve designed to moderate prices through release and stockpiling of grain. For a brief discussion
of the two kinds of reserves, see Coats, Gabany and Scommenga, supra note 15, at 3; H.R. REP., supra
note 1, at 7.
18. See U.S.C. § 1736f-l(b) (1982). The CCC is an agency of the United States government and is
under the general direction of the Department of Agriculture. Its purpose is to stabilize farm income and
prices, maintain adequate supplies of agricultural commodities, and facilitate distribution of com-
modities. The CCC acquires and stocks commodities and disposes of them through domestic and
foreign sales and provides grain for distribution under P.L. 480. OFFICE oF FEDERAL REGISTER,
NATIONAL ARCHIVEs & RECORD SERv., GENERAL SERV. ADMIN., U.S. GOV'T MANUAL 113 (1984/85).
The CCC also makes loans to farmers and collects stocks as collateral when a farmer defaults on a loan.
7 U.S.C. § 1425 (1982); 7 C.F.R. § 1421.1, 1421.17(a)(1) (1985). It may be used by the Secretary of
Agriculture for purposes of price support programs. 7 U.S.C. § 1424 (1982). See generally U.S. DEP'T
OF AoRICULTURE, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL CONDITION AND OPERATIONS OF a COMMODITY CRDrr
CORU'ORATION (1983).
19. 7 U.S.C. § 1736f-l(b) & (e) (1982). The farming community has expressed some anxiety about
the authority to purchase directly from producers, rather than in the market, on the grounds that
purchases in the former result in distorted market signals. Joint Hearing, supra note 6, at 70-71;
International Emergency Wheat Reserve, supra note 16, at 153, 156.
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and carryover needs, 20 or (2) to provide urgent humanitarian relief for a
major disaster in a developing country, as determined by the President,
without regard to the domestic supply situation.2' These limitations on use
enhance food security and ensure that the reserve will not be dumped on the
market and depress grain prices to the detriment of the American farmer. 22
Authority to replenish the reserve will expire September 30, 1990.23
In 1983, Congress considered two bills which would have partially
released the reserve for purposes other than food aid, one onto the domestic
market and the other onto export markets. 24 Congress passed the
20. 7 U.S.C. § 1736f-l(c) (1982). This subsection authorizes the President to release reserve stocks
even when P.L. 480 § 401(a) is triggered. Section 401(a) ordinarily prohibits distribution when the
domestic supply is insufficient to meet domestic demand, export demand, and carryover needs. 7
U.S.C. § 1731(a) (1982). Section 401(a) caused the United States' inability to provide adequate food aid
during the 1970's famine. See supra note 6.
21. 7 U.S.C. § 1736f-l(c) (1982).
22. Both the Act and its legislative history make clear that the reserve is intended solely for food aid
under Title II of P.L. 480. See S. REP. No. 676, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1980); H.R. REP., supra note 1,
at 7, 10; Joint Hearing, supra note 6, at 2, 30, 47, 63. The restriction on use was intended not only to
ensure food security but also to protect the American farmer. Separate Views of Hon. Margaret
Heckler, H.R. REP. pt. 2, supra note 6, at 40. Legislators were concerned that the reserve not depress
domestic prices through either release or purchase for replenishment at a time when the domestic supply
of wheat is low. See id. at 6-8, 19, 20, 39; Joint Hearing, supra note 6, passim.
Perhaps the major opponents to the establishment of the reserve were the American farming
organizations. Grain reserves have traditionally had the effect of dampening prices; this is a highly
controversial aspect of establishing any reserve. GAO RPEoRr, supra note 12, at 26-27. A particular
concern of the farmers was that the wheat might be dumped onto the market and depress prices. Another
concern is that reserves can "overhang" the market by dampening prices wfien market behavior
changes in anticipation of the release of grain. See, e.g., H.R. REP. pt. 2, supra note 6, at 32, 39
(statements of several representatives); Joint Hearings, supra note 6, at 68 (statement of the American
Farm Bureau Federation); International Emergency Wheat Reserve, supra note 16, at 91-92 (statement
of the Nat'l Ass'n of Wheat Growers). This has been a deeply imbedded and long-standing concern of
the farming community regarding any goernment-held reserve. See Walczak, supra note 5, at 570
n.83; see also 101 FARM J. 64 (Nov. 1977); 101 FARM J. 72 (Oct. 1977); 99 FARM J. 50 (April 1975).
Farmers have also been concerned thapCongress can be pressured into changing the purposes for and
the circumstances under which a reserve can be released. If it does, they have little protection against
those managing the reserves. See, e.g.,. 99 FARM J., supra, at 50 (editorial reflecting farmers' concern
that voters can pressure Congress into changing the release trigger point for a reserve). See also
International Emergency Wheat Reserve, supra note 16, at 92 (statement of W. Wilson, Vice President,
Nat'l Ass'n of Wheat Growers). These fears were realized in 1983 when Congress enacted a bill that
allowed release of the reserve for purposes other than relief. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
23. 7 U.S.C. § 1736f-l(i) (1982). The Food Security Wheat Reserve Act is sunset legislation. The
act was originally due to expire September 30, 1985, but was reenacted in the same form for another five
years when the 1985 Farm Bill was recently passed. Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198,
§ 1013, 99 Stat. 1456 (1985).
24. The bills were S. 17, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (see also companion House version H.R.
1590); and S. 822, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). The first bill passed. See infra note 25 and
accompanying text. The latter bill would have given portions of the reserve as pro rata bonuses to
foreign countries based on the amount of grain purchased from the United states. This latter bill was
rejected. See Bread for the World, col. I (April 1983), for a brief explanation of the bills.
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Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Act of 1983, permitting use of
reserve stocks for domestic nutrition projects.25 The enactment of the bill
demonstrated the inadequacy of a legislative guarantee limiting the use of
the reserve. It showed that Congress might be pressured at any time to
amend the language restricting the use of the reserve. This angered both
farmers threatened by reduced prices and citizens concerned with the
credibility of United States food aid commitments, who saw the measures
as weakening food security.26
II. PROPOSALS FOR INSULATING THE RESERVE
Now that the threat to food security has been exposed, Congress should
consider corrective amendments that would more adequately protect the
reserve from non-food aid uses than would a mere legislative prohibition.
This Comment proposes two alternative solutions. Both involve contracts
between individual farmers or producers and the government. One, how-
ever, is founded on property principles, while the other is founded on
contract rights. 27
First, the farmer could retain, pursuant to a provision in the sales contract,
a possibility of reverter in wheat sold to the government that is earmarked for
the reserve. The possibility of reverter would become possessory upon a non-
Title II use of the grain, so that the farmer could sue to recover the value of the
property. In order to make a non-Title II use, then, the government would
have to pay for the same grain twice. A non-Title II use would become too
costly to the government and hence deter it from such a use.
Second, the farmer could sell wheat to the government under a contract
that assesses liquidated damages against the government for a non-Title II
25. The Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Act of 1983 allowed partial release of the Food
Security Wheat Reserve to supplement various domestic nutrition projects. Pub. L. No. 98-8, tit. 11, 97
Stat. 35 (codied at 7 U.S.C. § 612(c) (Supp 11983)). Although it can be argued that use of the reserve
for nutrition projects is worthy and in accord with the goal of alleviating hunger, such a use of the
reserve is unwise. So long as domestic supply is ample to supplement the nutrition projects, use of the
reserve for this purpose sets up an unnecessary conflict between future famine victims and those who
would benefit from domestic nutrition projects. The purpose of the reserve is to ensure an adequate
supply of wheat during a global grain shortage. Use of that wheat for other purposes, no matter how
noble, when other wheat can be easily used, threatens food security. The eventual result of the current
management of the stocks could be another episode of decreased food shipments in a famine, similar to
the situation in the early 1970's. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. That is precisely the problem
Congress resolved to end when it created the reserve.
26. See Bread for the World, supra note 24, at 2, col. 1, for a good statement of the anti-hunger
lobby's opposition to the two bills. The article also notes the opposition of the Community Nutrition
Institute and the National Farmers Union.
27. The concepts inherent in the property proposal involve future interests and are less familiar to
farmers and legislators, but this alone should not lead to a rejection of the proposal. See infra notes
106-09 and accompanying text.
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use. The damages specified would equal the market price of the disbursed
wheat and the government therefore would be deterred in the same way as
under the first proposal. Although such damages might be invalid as a
penalty under common law, statutory law could authorize them for this
specific use.
Either scheme could be created in the sales contracts for the wheat when
originally sold to the government for purposes of replenishing the reserve.
Such a new contract scheme would require legislative authorization. The
proposed legislation is contained in the Appendix.
This Comment concludes that the future interest proposal is superior
because the Constitution more adequately protects it from subsequent
congressional repeal of the authorizing legislation. However, an evaluation
of the desirability of risking a subsequent repeal turns upon social and
political factors beyond the scope of this Comment. Ultimately, then, the
selection of the better proposal is left to the policymaker.
A. Governing Law
Since the proposed schemes involve sales contracts, an initital consid-
eration in analyzing the scheme is the law that should govern the contracts.
Federal law, not state law, usually governs public contracts with the federal
government. Although the Erie doctrine previously mandated the applica-
tion of state law, 28 an exception has been created for government contracts,
especially for contracts entered into pursuant to authority conferred by
federal statute.29 Hence, the contracts contemplated in this Comment will
be interpreted according to federal common law. Although the federal
common law for contracts has been developing since Erie, 30 federal courts
have had little occasion to develop a body of federal law dealing with the
aspects of the future interest proposal. 31 A court asked to interpret the
28. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Before 1938, federal common law controlled
diversity actions. Erie overturned that doctrine and required the application of state law.
29. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,366-67 (1943), held that Erie did not apply
where a direct federal interest exists, and Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411
(1947), established that federal law governs the interpretation of sales contracts between the government
and a private party. United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 209 (1970), established that federal law
governs the interpretation of contracts entered into pursuant to authority conferred by federal statute.
See also Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1977) (dicta); Fort Vancouver Plywood v.
United States, 747 F. 2d 547, 552 (9th Cir. 1984); Clem Perrin Marine Towing v. Panama Canal Co.,
730 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Crain, 589 F.2d 996, 998 (9th Cir. 1979). See
generally Keyes, Consideration Reconsidered-The Problem of the Withdrawn Bid, 10 STAN. L. Rev.
441, 463 (1958).
30. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 29 and accompanying text; infra notes 34-37 and accompany-
ing text.
31. Research reveals no cases in which courts have applied federal common law on the creation of
604
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proposal might find it necessary to fashion new federal common law.32
In fashioning post-Erie federal common law, a court may rely on all
source materials of common law,33 including pre-Erie federal law,34 state
law,35 and federal policy.3 6 Where a rule of law is nearly unanimously
accepted among state jurisdictions, it is likely to be absorbed into federal
common law.37 State law, which is almost unanimous in its treatment of the
possibility of reverter, then, is a probable source for the courts in fashioning
law for the interpretation of the contracts. This is especially so since
property law is traditionally the domain of the state court and not the federal
court. Hence, state law is drawn upon in the following property discussion.
B. Future Interest Proposal
Under one proposed alternative, in order to ensure compliance with Title
II, the farmer would retain a possibility of reverter in the wheat that the
farmer sells to the government. 38 The government would purchase a fee
possibilities of reverter in personal property or consumable property or on the alienability of future
interests.
32. For instance, a court may have to go beyond mere statutory interpretation to fashion a body of
federal common law pertaining to the nature of the fee simple determinable and possibility of reverter,
in the context of the reserve, to aid in the interpretation.
33. See Clearfield, 318 U.S. at 367 (federal courts may rely on their own standards); United States
v. Best, 573 F2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1978).
34. Clearfield, 318 U.S. at 367; see, e.g., Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. at 411-13
(Court relied on pre-Erie federal law to interpret a post-Erie government sales contract); Francis v.
Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445,449-50 (1948) (Court used pre-Erie decision on railroad's liability to
those riding with free passes to fashion a post-Erie construction of the Hepburn Act). See also Francis v.
Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. at 452 (Black, J., dissenting) (federal courts should not automatically rely
on a pre-Erie rule without appraising its soundness in relation to modern policy).
35. Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1939); Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,457 (1957); United States v. Crain, 589 F.2d 996,999 (9th Cir. 1979); see,
e.g., United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. at 211 n.15 (Court relied on state decisions in fashioning
federal common law); Clem Perrin Marine Towing v. Panama Canal Co., 730 F.2d 186, 189 (8th Cir.
1984); United States v. Conrad Publishing Co., 589 F. 2d 949, 953 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 809-11 (5th Cir. 1971) (UCC as a source of federal common law).
36. Although federal policy is not generally used as a source of common law, it is relied upon in the
sense that state law may not be absorbed into federal law where it is inconsistent with federal policy.
Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1939); United States v. Crain, 589 F.2d 996,
999 (9th Cir. 1979); accord Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 452 (1948) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (federal courts should not automatically rely on a pre-Erie rule without appraising its
soundness in relation to modern policy).
37. See, e.g.. United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. at 211; Clem Perrin Marine Towing v. Panama
Canal Co., 730 F.2d 186, 189 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Conrad Publishing Co., 589 F.2d 949,
953 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hext, 444 F.2d 804, 809-10 (5th Cir. 1971). "
38. A possibility of reverter is a future interest which automatically becomes possessory upon the
occurrence of a stated event; it is the future interest which follows ttie fee simple determinable. L. SIMEs
& A. SMrrH, THE LAw OF FuTuRE INTr srs § 281 (2d ed. 1956); RmsTATEmENT oF PRoPERTY § 154
(1936).
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simple determinable title in the reserve wheat rather than a fee simple
absolute. 39 To accomplish this, the sales contract would stipulate that the
government holds title to the grain "so long as" it does not dispose of the
wheat in a manner inconsistent with Title II or the replenishment provisions
of the Food Security Wheat Reserve Act.40 The determinable fee would
terminate, and title would revert back to the farmer, if the government used
the wheat for any purposes other than Title II. The owner of the possibility
of reverter, once it became possessory upon violation by the government,
would have an enforceable remedy.
However, the future interest remedy could not merely be agreed upon by
the farmer and the government, with the assumption that common law will
recognize their agreement. Rather, the remedy would require statutory
authorization for several reasons. Under common law, a possibility of
reverter cannot be created in wheat. Furthermore, even if it could be created
in wheat, the farmer would be forced to pursue third party donees/vendees
in order to enforce the remedy. The farmer would also have little protection
against government condemnation of the wheat. The proposed legislation
easily resolves these common law problems.
1. Creation of the Future Interest in Wheat
The proposed legislation expressly states that a possibility of reverter
may be created in the reserve wheat even though it is consumable. 41
Although future interests may generally be created in personal property,42
39. A fee simple determinable is an estate in fee simple which automatically expires upon the
occurence of a stated event. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 44 (1936).
40. This language effectively creates a possibilityo f reverter. L. SiMEs &A. SMrrt, supra note 38,
at § 281; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 44 comment 1 (1936).
41. See Appendix, subsection (b)(4)(A) (future interest alternative).
42. No identifiable federal common law appears to exist on this issue. The only federal cases on
point interpret state law under the Erie doctrine, and hence do not constitute federal common law. See,
e.g., In re Reifsteck, 71 F. Supp. 157, 158 (E.D. II1. 1947) (Illinois law); Kirkman v. Wilmington Trust
Co., 61 F. Supp. 651, 653 (D. Del. 1945) (Delaware law, dicta, that future interests in personalty
following a life estate take effect as executory interests and not by way of remainder).
For state cases, see Woodward v. Clark, 236 N.C. 190, 72 S.E.2d 433,435 (1952) (dicta) (generally
accepted rule in United States is that future interests may be created in personal property by both deed
and will); Storkan v. Ziska, 406 I1. 259, 94 N.E.2d 185, 189 (1950); In re Estate of Edgar, 137 Mich.
App. 419, 357 N.W.2d 867, 869 n.2 (1984). See generally RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 153 (1936); L.
SiMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 7, at 13-14 (2d ed. 1966); 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estates § 22 (1966). But
see Finlayson v. Cabarrus Bank & Trust Co., 181 F. Supp. 838, 847 (M.D.N.C. 1960), aff'd sub nom.
Cabarrus Bank & Trust Co. v. Finlayson, 286 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1961); Woodward v. Clark, 72 S.E.2d at
435-36 (North Carolina and England permit the creation of future interests in personal property by will
but not deed).
The rule against perpetuities does not apply to possibilities of reverter and will therefore not be
addressed in the legislative language. Klamath Falls v. Bell, 7 Or. App. 330, 490 P.2d 515, 518 n.3
(1971); L. SiMES & A. SMrH, supra note 38, § 825, at 311.
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they may not be created in consumable goods, and an attempted transfer of
a future interest in consumables is usually taken as a transfer of a fee simple
absolute. 43 Wheat is considered a consumable good for the purposes of this
rule.44 This common law problem, however, can be overcome by legislative
fiat, and hence, the proposed amendment states that a possibility or reverter
can be validly created in wheat sold for the reserve.
2. Proper Defendants and Theories of Recovery
The legislation provides that the farmer may sue the government directly
to recover the value of his or her grain. This is necessary to prevent the
fanner from having to identify and pursue multiple defendants.
So long as a future interest was validly created in the grain, title to the
grain would revert to the farmer whenever the government used the grain for
a non-Title II purpose. Non-Title II uses triggering the reverter clause
would consist of sale, consumption by a party, or donation to a party other
than a recipient under Title II of P.L. 480. 45 All of these uses involve a
transfer from the government.46
Under common law, the owner of a possibility of reverter, once pos-
sessory, would sue the party in possession of the property in order to regain
possession. Therefore, the farmer, as the injured party, would generally sue
the buyers or donees rather than the government.47 In the case of real
43. No federal law exists on this issue. However, this appears to be the majority state rule. See, e.g.,
Schowalter v. Schowalter, 217 Ala. 418, 116 So. 116, 118 (1928), later app. 128 So. 458 (1930); Hall's
Adm'rv. Hall's Ex'r, 265 Ky. 528, 97 S.W.2d 23,25 (1936); Davison's Adm'rv. Davison's Adm'x, 149
Ky. 571,149 S.W. 982,983 (1912); Whittemore v. Russell, 80 Me. 297, 14.A. 197, 198 (1888); Innes v.
Potter, 130 Minn. 320,153 N.W. 604, 606 (1915); Poindexter v. Wachovia Bank&Trust Co., 258 N.C.
371, 128 S.E.2d 867, 875 (1963); Williard v. Weavil, 222 N.C. 492, 23 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1943). See
also Leach v. McCreary, 183 Tenn. 128, 191 S.W.2d 176, 178 (1945)(dicta); L. SImms, supra note 42,
§ 8, at 15. But see In re Marriage of Voloshin, 652 P.2d 1096, 1099 (Colo. App. 1982) (language of
written property agreement overcomes rule); Walker v. Pritchard, 121111. 221, 12 N.E. 336, 337-38
(1887) (language of will controls; remandermen whose interestfollows a life-estate in consumables are
entitled to that which was not consumed following the legatee's death).
44. Walker v. Pritchard, 121111.221,12 N.E. 336 at 337-38; Davison's Adm'rv. Davison'sAdm'x,
149 Ky. 571,149 S.W. 982,983 (1912); cf. Henderson v. Vaulx, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 30,34 (1836) (corn);
see also Meyer v. Martin, 351 Il1. 386, 184 N.E. 617 (1933) (chattel mortgage invalid due to consumable
nature of corn, straw, hay).
45. For example, the Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Act of 1983, 7 U.S.C. § 612(c)
(Supp. 1983), authorized release of Food Security Wheat Reserve Stocks on a donation basis to
supplement domestic nutrition programs. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
46. The only non-Title II use that does notclearly involve transfer is consumption. However, courts
have held that giving authority to consume property is tantamount to transfer of a fee simple absolute.
See Poindexter v. Wachiova Bank & Trust Co., 258 N.C. 371, 128 S.E.2d 867, 875 (1963); Davison's
Adm'r v. Davison's Adm'x, 149 Ky. 571, 149 S.W. 982, 983 (1912).
47. The buyer/donee's liability to the farmer may be based on more than one theory. First, one who
receives chattel, with the intent to acquire ownership (the buyer/donee), from one who has no authority
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property, with respect to which most future interest cases arise, it is easy to
identify the property and the possessor. In the case of fungible goods like
grain, however, it is very difficult to identify and locate the buyers or
donees. Potential defendants could be numerous. 48
More importantly, requiring the farmer to sue the third party would
weaken the deterrent effect on the government, the major goal of the
legislation, because the penalty to the government would never arise unless
both the farmer's suit and the buyer's subsequent suit against the govern-
ment for transfer of void title were successful. To resolve this problem, the
legislation stipulates that the possibility of reverter would attach to the
proceeds of the government's sale or to CCC assets which the government
would hold in trust for the farmer/vendor. 49 The farmer could then pursue
his or her remedy against the government directly.
3. Provision for Condemnation of the Future Interest
The proposed legislation also provides that if the possiblity of reverter is
condemned, it would be compensable and valued at the market price of the
same grade and amount of grain. This would ensure the same degree of
deterrence that the scheme provides when condemnation does not occur.
Since the farmer's possibility of reverter is a property interest, it can be
condemned. 50 A taking by condemnation is usually defined by the courts as
the state's deprivation of ownership of private property without consent and
for public use, with just compensation. 51 Even if the amendments proposed
in this Comment protected the farmer against transfers to third parties, the
government could still condemn the possibility of reverter prior to any
to transfer title (the government), is liable for conversion to the party entitled to immediate possession
(the farmer). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 229 (1965). This is true even if the transferee takes
possession without knowledge of the third party's claim. Id. comment (e). Second, the buyer/donee
would be liable in a quiet title action in states which allow such actions with respect to chattel.
48. The number of defendants would depend on the number of parties to whom the government
sold or donated wheat. For instance, if the government donated the wheat to domestic feeding
programs, thousands of parties across the country might eventually come into possession of some of the
wheat.
49. See Appendix, subsection (b)(4)(B) (future interest alternative). The United States government
can hold property in trust. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908); cf. Preston v. Walsh, 10 Fed.
315 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1882) (state can act as trustee), rev'don other grounds, 109 U.S. 297 (1883): 2 A.
SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 95 (3d. ed. 1967).
Although the United States can validly act as a trustee, such a trust may be difficult to enforce because
of the sovereign's immunity to suit. This can be overcome by a statute permitting the party to sue. See,
e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); see also 2 A. SCOTT, supra, at § 95. A
provision in the proposed amendments expressly permitting suit to enforce the trust should solve the
problem. See supra note 18 for the nature and purpose of the Commodity Credit Corporation.
50. See generallyL. SIMES, supra note 42, at § 54; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 53 comments a&
b (1936).
5 1. See generally 1 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11 (3d ed. 1985).
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non-complying disposition of the wheat. Often, when the government
contemplates taking private land for public use, it will negotiate a sale with
the private party.5 2 If the private party does not accept a government offer,
the government will commence condemnation proceedings in which the
court determines the amount of compensation. 53
The deterrent value of the farmer's remedy would be lost unless the
farmer could demand an amount of compensation for the taking that would
be as costly to the government as purchase of the same amount and grade of
wheat on the market. In order to guarantee an amount of compensation
sufficient to deter the government, the legislation resolves two issues in
favor of the farmer. First, the legislation stipulates that the farmer's pos-
sibility of reverter would be compensable. 54 Second, because courts will
distribute the amount of just compensation between the holder of the fee
simple determinable (the government) and the holder of the possibility of
reverter (the farmer), the legislation enables the farmer to claim a sufficient
proportion of the award. 55
At common law the farmer would not always be entitled to compensation
where the government condemned the wheat before converting it to a non-
Title II use.56 According to the majority rule, the farmer would be entitled
to compensation only if the occurrence of the event that would .terminate
the determinable fee were imminent.57 A minority rule uses the test of
52. 7 J. SAcK mA, supra note 51, at § 5.01.
53. Id.
54. Appendix, subsection (b)(3)(C) (future interest alternative).
55. Appendix, subsection (b)(3)(C) (future interest alternative). See L. StEs, supra note 42,
§ 54, at 115, and Stoyles, Condemnation of Future Interests, 43 IowA L. REv. 241, 245 (1958), for an
explanation of these issues.
56. The only clear example of a situation in which the farmer would have a right to compensation
under the common law is where the government used the wheat for a non-Title II purpose before
condemning it. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Cavendish, 134 W. Va. 361, 59 S.E.2d 459 (1950) (where the
event which terminates a fee simple determinable occurs before condemnation, the holder of the
possibility of reverter, rather than the holder of the determinable fee, is entitled to compensation); see
generally 27 AM. JuR. 21 EminentDomain § 251 (1966); Annot., 81A.L.R. 2D § 4, at 568,578 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Annot.]. The compensation referred to here is distinct from the relief afforded by
the proposed legislation upon the occurrence of a non-Title II use. The latter is based on a claim to the
ownership of the wheat by reason of the future interest having become possessory. The compensation
discussed here is that which the government is constitutionally required to pay a property owner upon
condemnation of the property.
57. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 53 comment b (1936); L. Szms, supra note 42, § 54, at 119;
Stoyles, supra note 55, at 247; see also Annot., supra note 56, § 2, at 570. Federal courts follow the
Restatement rule. See, e.g., United States v. 726.23 Acres of Land, 746 F.2d 1363, 1364-65 (8th Cir.
1984); United States v. 635.76 Acres of Land, 319 F Supp. 763,767-68 (W.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 447
F.2d 1405 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. 16 Acres of Land, 47 F. Supp. 603, 604 (D.Mass. 1942);
United States v. 1119.15 Acres of Land, 44 F. Supp. 449,449-50 (E.D. Ill. 1942). See also Midwestern
Developments v. Tulsa, 374 F.2d 683, 688 (10th Cir. 1967) (recognizes rule in dicta); Woodville v.
United States, 152 F.2d 735,737-38 (10th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 842 (1946) (pertaining to
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imminence but would give the farmer a nominal award even if the terminat-
ing event were not imminent.58 Very little case law exists in this area,59 but
courts, although purporting to allow compensation according to the major-
ity rule, have shown reluctance to find that the terminating event was
imminent and allow recovery.6°
In no reported case has the government-owner of a determinable fee
condemned a possibility of reverter to avoid transfer of title upon the
occurrence of a terminating event. 61 In such a situation, it is possible that a
court would find bad faith on the part of the government and award the
farmer compensation. 62 However, without a case on point it is difficult to
an easement). See generally Annot., supra note 56, § 2, at 570.
Condemnation itself could not be considered a non-Title II use. Courts hold that the mere taking of
land by condemnation and the subsequent use for purposes other than those specified in the conveyance
does not result in a breach converting the future interest into a present interest. Annot., supra note 56,
§ 2, at 571; L. SIMES, supra note 42, § 54, at 119; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY 53 comment b (1936);
Stoyles, supra note 55, at 252 n.63, 253-54; Comment, The Effect of Condemnation Proceedings by
Eminent Domain Upon a Possiblity of Reverter or Power of Termination, 19 VILL. L. REV. 137, 157
(1973). Federal decisions are in accord with this rule. 635.76 Acres of Land, 319 F. Supp. at 767; 16
Acres of Land, 47 F. Supp. at 604; 1119.15 Acres of Land, 44 F. Supp. at 449-50. See 726.23 Acres of
Land, 746 F.2d at 1364 (imminence independent of the taking is required). See also Land Clearance v.
St. Joseph, 560 S.W.2d 285, 288-89 (Mo. App. 1977); L. SiMFS, supra note 42, § 54, at 119 (list of
federal decisions following this rule). The owner is entitled to the value of the future interest as if
eminent domain proceedings were not imminent. The value, however, is usually insignificant. L.
SIMES, supra note 42, § 54, at 119. See, e.g., 635.76 Acres of Land, 319 F. Supp. at 768.
A related issue is whether the existence of the condemnation proceedings themselves may be used as
evidence of imminence of a non-Title II use of the wheat. It could be argued that the government would
not initiate condemnation proceedings unless a non-Title II use is contemplated and is an immediate
prospect. Such contemplation, in turn, indicates the existence of necessary imminence. However,
research reveals no cases addressing the use of condemnation proceedings as evidence of imminence.
(This dearth of case law may be attributable to the rare instance of the federal government holding a
possessory estate. When it does hold a possessory estate, the terminating event is often the cessation of a
public interest use. Because the government can condemn property only for a contemplated public use,
condemnation of a government held possessory estate would be even more rare.) Condemnation could
only be used as evidence of imminence where the government, which holds the power to condemn, also
is capable, as holder of a possessory estate, of terminating the possessory estate. This would be an issue
of first impression.
58. See, e.g., Midwestern Developments v. Tulsa, 374 F.2d 683, 688 (10th Cir. 1967); Erie
Lackawanna Ry. v. State, 330 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1972).
59. See generally L. SIMES, supra note 42, § 54, at 119; Annot., supra note 56; 27 AM. JUR. 2D
Eminent Domain § 251 (1966).
60. See generally Stoyles, supra note 55, at 247; Comment, Compensation for Possibilities of
Reverter and Powers of Termination Under Condemnation Law, 20 HASTINGs L.J. 787 (1969); Annot.,
supra note 56, at 577.
61. Research reveals no reported case on this issue. Because the government can condemn only for
public use, condemnation of the government's own determinable fee would be rare. In most cases in
which the government holds a determinable fee, it is for public purposes, such as for a park, and the
terminating event is the cessation of public use. See supra note 57.
62. Bad faith is sometimes used as a legal principle to justify decisions. See, e.g., Hull v. Petrillo,
439 F.2d 1184 (2d Cir. 1971); Montgomery County Board of Educ. v. Shelton, 327 F. Supp. 811 (N.D.
Miss. 1971); United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Authority v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F. Supp. 811
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guarantee that the farmer would be compensated, and it is advisable to
resolve the problem with a legislative scheme which stipulates that the
farmer's possibility of reverter is compensable regardless of the imminence
of a non-food aid use before the taking.
Even if the farmer were entitled to compensation, the common law rules
for distributing compensation between the owner of the future interest and
the holder of the fee simple determinable would not guarantee the farmer an
amount of compensation sufficient to deter the government from disposing
of wheat for non-Title II purposes. If the farmer were entitled to compensa-
tion, the award would be distributed so as to fairly represent the proportion-
ate value of the government's and the farmer's respective interests. 63 Both
the holder of the defeasible fee and the future interest would receive a
portion of the award, and the exact division may depend on the imminence
of the terminating event.64"For instance, the owner of the future interest is
entitled to the entire award so long as the eminent domain proceedings take
place after the event which terminates the defeasible fee.65 However, the
rules for distribution are not well formulated; very little case law has
emerged66 and the farmer would be guaranteed no more than a nominal
award. The failure to guarantee adequate compensation for the farmer's
future interest would undermine any common law scheme for insulating the
reserve. Adequate compensation must be statutorily mandated if the re-
serve is to be insulated. 67
(1941); Locke v. Kansas Fire & Casualty Co., 8 Kan. App. 2d 678, 665 P.2d 776 (1983); Riggs v.
Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22N.E. 188 (1889). SeegenerallyR. DwoRKIN, TAKiNGRIGsHT SERIousLY22-31
(1978).
63. Midwestern Developments v. Tulsa, 374 F.2d 683, 688 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v.
2,184.81 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 681,684 (W.D. Ark. 1942) (following Restatement rule); State v.
Independent School District, 266 Minn. 85, 123 N.W.2d 121, 128, 129-30 (Minn. 1963) (following
Restatement rule; using a well-defined formula); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 53 comment c (1936);
Annot., supra note 56, § 3, at 576.
64. Again, no case law is apparent in this area. In only one case has a court even found the requisite
imminence, so that the issue of how the award should be distributed was reached. In that case, the court
gave the value of the land to the holder of the possibility of reverter and the value of a school building on
that land to the holder of the defeasible fee. United States v. 2184.81 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 681
(W.D. Ark. 1942). See also Chew v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 307, 161 A.2d 621 (1960) (remanded to
trial court for consideration of how award should be distributed between parties). The lack of case law
on this issue has also been noted in Comment, The Effect of Condemnation Proceedings by Eminent
Domain Upon a Possibility of Reverter or Power of Termination, 19 VuL. L. REv. 137,158 (1973); and
Annot., supranote56, § 3, at 576, and § 4, at 578. The absence of any definitive law makes it difficult
to predict how courts will respond in the future.
65. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Cavendish, 134 W. Va. 361, 59 S.E.2d 459, 463 (1950). See generally
Annot., supra note 56, § 4, at 578.
66. See supra note 64.
67. See appendix, subsection (b)(3)(C) (future interest alternative).
Several cases have held that Congress does not have the power to set the level of compensation since
this is exclusively a judicial function. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 620 F.2d 812 (Ct. Cl. 1980);
United States v. Bauman, 56 F. Supp. 109 (D.C. Or. 1943). However, it appears that the purpose of this
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The statute, then, remedies the uncertainties inherent in current common
law regarding reverters. A common law scheme based on a farmer's
possibility of reverter alone would not be effective in providing a remedy
against the government for a non-Title II disposition of the wheat. The
statute would permit the creation of a possibility of reverter in the wheat, as
a consumable good, and would also guarantee the farmer adequate com-
pensation if the wheat is condemned. The statutory scheme would also
make it easier for the farmer to pursue a remedy because it would allow the
farmer to sue the government rather than pursue the third party recipient of
the wheat.
C. Liquidated Damages Proposal
The alternative proposed legislation would require two provisions in the
contract of sale. One provision would make it a breach of contract for the
government to use the grain for non-Title II purposes and the other would
be a liquidated damages clause making the government liable to the farmer
for the market value of the dispensed grain if the contract were breached.
The legislation also provides that the liquidated damages clause would not
be invalid as a penalty.
Liquidated damages may be used in government contracts, 68 but are
usually assessed against the private party.69 Liquidated damages, however,
when assessed against the government, would deter the government from
selling the grain.
Statutory authority would be necessary to make such a liquidated dam-
ages clause enforceable against the government. At common law, a liqui-
dated damages clause is not valid and enforceable if it amounts to a
penalty.70 Yet, in order for the liquidated damages clause to have any
rule is to protect condemnees from receiving less than the potential judicially determined amount ofjust
compensation. Several cases have held that Congress is free to set a level of compensation that is higher
than that which is constitutionally required. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller. 409 U.S. 488 (1973);
United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Authority v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F. Supp. 811 (D.C. Tenn.
1941); Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. United States, 181 Ct. Cl. 739 (1967). Since the most
the holder of a possibility of reverter can receive in a condemnation award is the market value of the
property as if taken as a fee simple absolute, the proposed legislation will not deprive the farmer of his or
her constitutional rights and should overcome the above constitutional barrier.
68. The federal government may resort to the same contract remedies, including liquidated
damages, as a private person. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 151 (1956). See 41 U.S.C.
§ 256a (1965) (regulates release of duty to pay liquidated damages in federal contracts); see also Priebe
& Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1947).
69. Research reveals no reported case in which liquidated damages were assessed against the
government.
70. See generally D. DOBBS, REMEDIES: DAMAGs-EQurTY-REsTrrtroN § 12.5, at 822 (1973);
J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRAcrs §§ 14-31 to 14-35, at 564-69 (2d ed. 1970).
Courts use three factors in determining whether a liquidated damages clause is enforceable. See
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deterrent effect on Congress, it must provide for a significant amount of
damages. Such a provision might be held a penalty.71 Where a statute
authorizes a liquidated damages clause that amounts to a penalty, however,
the courts enforce the clause. 72 A clause providing that the government pay
the farmer the market price 73 of the wheat purchased through the sales
contract would effectively deter the government from disposing of the
reserve grain since the government could more easily and as cheaply
purchase grain off the market for a non-food aid use.
Hm. CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO BOTH PROPOSALS
A. Sovereign Immunity
The efficacy of both proposals depends on the farmer's ability to contract
with and sue the United States government if necessary. The sovereign
immunity of the United States would frustrate the proposals if the govern-
ment did not consent to contract and to be sued.
Although it would be unconstitutional for the government to commit
itself not to exercise a particular sovereign power, such as its power to
dispose of wheat for a non-Title II purpose, it can commit itself to pay
damages resulting from that exercise. 74 The government is immune from
suit, however, unless a waiver of sovereign immunity is unequivocally
expressed. 75 The proposed legislation authorizing such damages contains
United Order of Am. Bricklayers & Stone Masons Union v. Thorleif Larson & Son, 519 F.2d 331,
332-33 (7th Cir. 1975). See generally J. CA.AMARI & L PERILLO, supra, § 14-31, at 565. First, the
amount of loss resulting from breach must be difficult or impossible to.estimate. Finkle v. Gulf &
Western Mfg. Co., 744F.2d 1015,1021 (3d Cir. 1984) (Pa. law); see also Priebe& Sons, 332 U.S. at411
(dicta). Second, the parties must intend to provide for damages, not penalties. Id. Third, the sum must
be a reasonable estimate of the loss. Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 226 (1929).
71. The injury to the farmer/vendor is the loss of profits due to the depressed prices resulting from
release of the grain. See supra notes 22, 26 and accompanying text. Although the loss incurred by the
agricultural community as an interest group from the release of the reserve onto the market may be
significant, the loss sustained by any one particular farmer-vendor could be minimal. Since the remedy
belongs to the farmer-vendor as an individual, any liquidated damages clause requiring the government
to pay the farmer the entire market price of the grain would not be considered a reasonable estimate of
the loss.
72. See United States v. Zerbey, 271 U.S. 332,340 (1926); United States v Dieckerhoff, 202 U.S.
302,313 (1906); Vazquez v. E. AirLines, 579 F.2d 107, 110 n.3 (Ist Cir. 1978); Guess v. Montague, 140
F.2d 500, 504-05 (4th Cir. 1943); 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs § 775B (3d ed. 1961). For annotations on
particular statutes which authorize penalty clauses, see Annot., 26 A.L.R. FED. 607 (1976) (Fair Labor
Standards Act); Annot., 55 A.L.R. Fan. 604 (1981) (Age Discrimination Act of 1967).
73. The market price is determined by the quoted price for the same grade of wheat on the Chicago
Board of Trade, either on the date of original purchase or disposal, whichever is higher. Appendix,
subsection (b)(3)(B) (liquidated damages alternative).
74. Amino Bros Co. v. United States, 372 F.2d 485 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 846 (1967).
75. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980).
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an unequivocal waiver and would thus overcome any sovereign immunity
defense.
B. Changes in Accounting Procedures
Several aspects of the proposed schemes require specific accounting
procedures to make them effective. First, the legislation stipulates that a
first-in, first-out (FIFO) procedure will determine which farmers have an
interest in grain which is released for non-Title II purposes. Second, the
availability of CCC stocks for replenishment, although necessary to guar-
antee an adequate supply of wheat in the reserve, weakens the deterrent
effect of the proposed scheme. If some of the wheat in the reserve were to be
transferred from the CCC, the farmer would have no interest in that wheat,
and the government could release it without incurring liability. Various
accounting procedures would mitigate the problem.
If many farmers sold wheat for the reserve, and only a part of the reserve
were released, it would be necessary to identify which farmers had an
interest in the released wheat. This difficulty can be addressed by using a
FIFO accounting system 76 to identify which farmer would have an interest
and hence could sue the government.
However, the effectiveness of the remedies and FIFO assume that the
disposed wheat was originally acquired through a contract of sale with the
farmer. In reality, the reserve must be replenished by transfers of wheat
from CCC stocks whenever the Secretary of Agriculture determines that
purchases would "unduly disrupt" the market. 77 At any one time, then, the
wheat in the reserve could be composed of wheat in which the farmer has an
interest and wheat acquired from the CCC. Wheat from the CCC would not
be subject to any of the contract provisions and the government would be
free to dispose of that wheat as it wished without becoming liable to a
farmer.78 This would weaken the deterrent effect of the proposed schemes.
76. First-in, first-out is an inventory method which assumes, for the purposes of calculating the
costs of goods sold, that the goods acquired first are sold first. M. GRANOF, FINANCIAL AccoUNTING:
PRINCIPLES AND ISSUEs 292 (2d ed. 1980); E. FARIS, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 135 (3d ed. 1975). The
proposed procedure works in the same way, except that it is used to identify which vendor has an interest
in the grain disposed of, not the cost of such grain.
77. 7 U.S.C. § 1736f-l(b)(2) (1982). See supra note 18 for the nature and purpose of the CCC.
78. Several alternative ways of dealing with the CCC exist but they are less desirable. The problem
should not be solved by eliminating transfers from the CCC. Such a solution would frustrate the very
purpose for which the reserve was created: food security. See GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 8 (food
supply stability is a primary objective of United States food policy); see also supra notes 15-22 and
accompanying text. The Food Security Wheat Reserve Act states that the government can only
replenish the reserve by making purchases on the market or from producers where the Secretary of
Agriculture determines that doing so will not unduly disrupt the market. 7 U.S.C. § 1736f-l(b)(2)
(1982). Otherwise, replenishment must be accompanied by transfer from the CCC because such a
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Deterrence could be strengthened if two goals were accomplished: first,
the percentage of. wheat in the reserve in which farmers have an interest
should be increased to the greatest extent possible, and second, wheat
.released for Title II purposes should be considered CCC acquired wheat (to
the extent that wheat acquired from the CCC was in the reserve at the time
of the Title II use). An accounting procedure governing which wheat would
be disposed of first and the sources from which the goverment must first
replenish the reserve would achieve these goals.
The FIFO accounting procedure stipulates that whenever the govern-
ment disposes of wheat for a non-Title II use, the wheat that was acquired
through sales contracts is disposed of first, in the order that the wheat was
acquired through the individual sales contracts. Wheat acquired through
transfers from the CCC would be disposed of only after all the wheat in
which the farmers had an interest was dispered. Hence, if any wheat in the
reserve was acquired on the market, the government would be liable for a
non-Title II disposition of wheat, but the total amount of damages would
transfer would not interfere with the market.
If the legislation proposed that all CCC transfers be eliminated but that the market still be protected
from undue disruption, the government could only purchase wheat for the reserve at times when the
Secretary of Agriculture determined the market would not be "unduly disrupted." In that case, the
reserve might need to be replenished after a Title II release but the government would lack authority to
acquire the needed wheat, since it would disrupt the market. Less reserve wheat would then be available
for subsequent famine relief. This scenario would be very likely when wheat is released for Title H
purposes. Because the wheat could only be released when the Secretary of Agriculture has determined
the domestic supply is quite low, see supra note 20 and accompanying text, purchase in the market
would be likely to drive up prices and "unduly disrupt" the market; therefore the Secretary 'would
probably forbid replenishment. Such a circumstance would not be conduciye to food security.
Another possible solution is to eliminate the "unduly disrupt" language, so that the reserve would
never have to be replenished from the CCC. Elimination of the "unduly disrupt" language would not be
wise since the restriction helps maintain both the farmer's income and reasonable prices for the
consumer (both of these have been objectives of United States food policy) by regulating the supply.
GAO REPORT, supra note 12, at 8. A disruption of the market could frustrate these goals. This is why
insulation of the reserve must be accomplished without eliminating transfers from the CCC.
A third alternative would be to require all CCC acquisitions to conform to the amendments proposed
by the Comment, so that the farmers have an interest in wheat sold to the CCC and then transferred to the
reserve from the CCC. This method would be effective but probably amounts to too great an overhaul of
the CCC's normal methods of procurement to be attractive to Congress. Congress would probably
consider the administrative costs of overhauling the procurement process and the implementation of
accompanying accounting procedures too cumbersome. The accounting problem is compounded by the
fact that not all grain held by the CCC is acquired through sales contracts, so that it would be impossible
to subject all the CCC acquisitions to the proposals in this Comment. Some of the CCC stocks are
obtained as collateral when a farmer defaults on a loan. 7 U.S.C. § 1425 (1982). See also 7 C.F.R.
§ 1421.1 & 1421.17(a)(I) (1985); UNrrED STATES DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL
CONIMON AND OPERIONS OF THE COMMODITY CREDrr COR'ORATION 6 (September 30, 1983). The
government has title to such grain free from any restriction or encumbrance and could dispose of it
without creating liability to the farmer. The CCC's own accounting procedure would have to require that
such grain is transferred to the reserve last.
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depend on the amount of wheat released and the percentage that was
acquired on the market.
If this method were used, the effectiveness of the insulation would
depend on the percentage of wheat in the emergency reserve that was
orginally acquired through purchase. The deterrent effect on the govern-
ment would increase proportionately as the percentage of such wheat
increased. If the percentage of wheat acquired by purchase is small, the
government could dispose of it without incurring much cost, but if the
percentage is high, a non-Title II disposal would be costly.
In order to increase its deterrent effect, the legislation proposes that the
above accounting procedure be coupled with a statutory requirement that
the government maximize the percentage of purchased wheat in the reserve
and minimize the percentage of wheat transferred from the CCC. The
government would be required to seek wheat for replenishment in the
market before turning to the CCC. The statute also stipulates that whenever
the government purchases wheat off the market, the wheat purchased first
shall be earmarked for the Food Security Wheat Reserve, to the extent
needed for replenishment. Once enough wheat were purchased to replenish
the reserve, wheat could be acquired for other purposes. 79
C. The Farmer's Ability to Sue
The proposed legislation does not contain any provision that makes it
easier for the farmer to sue the government. Effective insulation of the Food
Security Wheat Reserve would be achieved in large part by making the
government vulnerable to suit by the agricultural community for a non-food
aid use of the reserve. Insulation would be most effective when the threat of
a lawsuit were greatest. Several methods of enhancing the farmer's ability
to sue are possible, including allowing assignment of the farmer's claim to
an entity more able to sue, awarding attorney's fees, and giving the farmer
who prevails a tax credit. However, since the selection of the best of these
suggested solutions requires balancing of competing social, economic, and
political factors, policymakers must decide which is most appropriate,
most feasible, and most acceptable.
Normally, there should be no serious impediment to a farmer's ability to
enforce his rights. Rarely would an issue of fact arise in a farmer's cause of
action. The major factual element would be the government's release of
grain, and this is unlikely to be contested. Hence, the filing of a claim or a
79. The government regularly acquires grain for CCC stockpiles. See supra note 18. The Secretary
of Agriculture has authority to purchase wheat for price support programs, 7 U.S.C. § 1445b-1 (Supp.
1984); and for the Producer Reserve Program. Id. § 1445e(h).
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summary judgment motion would often be the only action necessary for the
farmer to obtain settlement or judgment.
Should the government contest issues of fact and law, however, resolu-
tion out of court would be far less likely.80 Litigation would then be
necessary. Unless provisions are made to make it easier for the farmer to
sue, the expense and trouble of litigation could exceed the personal value of
a favorable judgment and deter the farmer from pursuing a lawsuit. For this
reason, it is important to have a provision in the proposed legislation
enabling the farmer to easily pursue litigation. Attorney's fees or a tax
credit would be effective because they would reduce the the farmer's costs.
The other suggestion is to allow the farmer to assign the claim to an
organization more able to bring suit,81 even though such assignments
otherwise would be void under current statutory and common law. 82 Class
action suits would also enhance the farmer's ability to sue.
80. For instance, the government might contest the constitutionality of a provision in the legisla-
tion.
81. One possible organization is the Family Farm Legal Defense Fund. It was organized to pursue
litigation of interest to the agricultural community and would accept the assignment of a claim from an
individual farmer in the right circumstances. Telephone interview with DeVon Woodland, Director of
the Family Farm Legal Defense Fund (Jan. 10, 1986) (notes on file with the Washington Law Review).
82. No federal case law is available on the alienability of future interests. Although future interests
were once considered non-alienable under common law, the modem trend is to allow alienability. See
Krick v. Klockenbrink, 242 N.E.2d 848, 852 (Ind. App. 1968). See generally RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY § 159 (1936); Note, Future Interests: Alienability ofPossibility ofReverter, 45 CORNELL L.Q.
373, 377 (1960). Some states have made the change by statute and others by judicial decision. A
compilation of such decisions and statutes may be found in 53 A.L.R. 2D 224, 234 (1957).
Assignment of the contract under the liquidated damages proposal requires further analysis. Al-
though contract rights are generally assignable, Rennie & Laughlin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 242 F.2d
208, 210 (9th Cir. 1957); see generally L CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 70, § 18-7, at 640,
assignments are subject to restrictions. Contract rights are not assignable if the assignment would: (1)
materially alter the duty of the other party, (2) increase materially the burden or risk borne by the other
party, or (3) materially impair the other party's chances of obtaining return performance. See generally
J. CALAMARI & J. PERILto, supra note 70, § 18-7, at 640; RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcs
§ 317(2)(a) (1981); U.C.C. § 2-210(2). These exceptions would not apply to the sales contracts
contemplated in this Comment: because the farmer has already performed, the government's duty, risk,
and chance of obtaining return performance could not be affected.
However, government contracts are subject to special limitations. A federal anti-assignment statute
voids any attempted assignment of certain claims against the government. The Assignment of Claims
Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (1982); and 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). This Act was held to prohibit the assignment
of claims against the United States government based on breach of contract in Bolivar Cotton Oil Co. v.
United States, 95 Ct. Cl. 182 (1941). See generally J. CALAMAI & J. PERMLO, supra note 70, § 18-13, at
646; 4 A. CORBiN, CoNTRAcTs § 857, at 410 (1951). In order to resolve any doubt that the contracts are
assignable, the proposed amendments specifically provide that the contract may be assigned at the
farmer's option. •
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D. Effect of Subsequent Repeal or Amendment of the Act
Just as the reserve requires insulation from non-food aid uses, the rights
created under the proposed legislation would require constitutional protec-
tion from subsequent legislative abrogation. Parties to contracts based on
either the property proposal or the liquidated damages proposal would
depend on the ability of the legislation to make remedies legally enforce-
able where they would not be under comnrion law. 83 However, the danger in
creating enforceability by statute lies in the possibility that Congress might
subsequently repeal the legislation or retroactively change the sections
validating the remedies. With such changes, the remedies would no longer
be recognized and deterrence from making a non-Title II use would be lost.
However, the fifth amendment determines the constitutionality of retroac-
tive changes and might require the government to compensate individuals
whose rights have been abrogated by changes in legislation; the Constitu-
tion would probably require the government to compensate the farmer for
the extinguished possibility of reverter, but the case for compensation of the
contract remedy is not as strong. To the extent that the fifth amendment
does mandate compensation, it would deter the government from making
retroactive changes, especially if those changes were made to avoid lia-
bility for an anticipated non-Title II use.
The due process clause of the fifth amendment determines the constitu-
tionality of legislation that retroactively abrogates a contract or property
right. 84 Although a variety of tests under the due process clause have been
suggested,85 most commentators agree that the test varies according to the
83. See supra notes 38-73 and accompanying text.
84. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V; Hochman, The Supreme Court & the Constitutionality of
Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REv. 692 (1960). Hochman is a frequently cited authority.
For illustrations of the fifth amendment application to property rights, see, e.g., Almota Farmers
Elevator& Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470 (1973); United States v. Commodities Trading
Corp., 339 U.S. 121, reh'g denied, 339 U.S. 950 (1950); United States v. RockRoyal Co-op., 26F. Supp.
534 (D.C.N.Y.), modified on other grounds, 307 U.S. 533, reh'g denied, 308 U.S. 631 (1939).
For contract rights, see, e.g., Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Lynch v. United States,
292 U.S. 571 (1934).
The contracts clause of the United States Constitution prohibits states from impairing contracts.
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 975 (1977); W.B. Worthen
Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935); Boetti v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1048 (D.C.
Mass. 1984). However, the language of the clause applies only to state action. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10,
cl. 1. See also John McShain, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 205 F.2d 882 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 900 (1953); Speckmann v. Paddock Chrysler Plymouth, 565 F. Supp. 469 (E.D. Mo. 1983);
Century Arms, Inc. v. Kennedy, 323 F. Supp. 1002 (D.C. Vt.), aff'd, 449 F.2d 1306 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1982). But see Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1870) (federal
legislation impairing contracts is inconsistent with spirit of constitution); Riveria v. Patino, 524 F
Supp. 136 (D.C. Cal. 1981) (clause applies to federal government through due process clause of fifth
amendment).
85. The traditional test is whether the legislation extinguishes a "vested right," but the test begs the
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category of retroactive legislation. 86 For instance, courts are likely to
uphold the constitutionality of retroactive legislation related to an emer-
gency, 87 taxation,88 or legislation that is curative. 89 If the legislation has
only a general retroactive effect, and the public interest served is not great,
the court is more likely to find it unconstitutional. 90 Underlying the tests
and the courts' reaction to the various categories is a balance between the
interests of the party whose rights have been abrogated and the public
interest served by the retroactive legislation. 91A court is much more likely
question since the definition of a "vested right" is a right that cannot be taken away by statute. See
Taxpayers for Animas-La Plata Referendum v. Animas-La Plata Water Conservatory Dist., 739 F.2d
1472,1477 (10th Cir. 1984); Adams Nursing Home v. Mathews, 548 F2d 1077,1081 (lst Cir. 1977). See
also Hochman, supra note 84, at 696. Hochman notes two otherproposed tests: whether the party had
relied to his detriment upon the asserted right, and whether the legislation gives effect to the parties'
reasonable expectation. Hochman, supra note 84, at 696. See also Slawson, Constitutional & Legis-
lative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CAL. L. Ray. 216, 225-33 (1960). Hochman
suggests that these tests do not sufficiently explain the Court's decisions and posits that, in fact, the
Court weighs three factors: the nature and strength of the public interest in the statute, the extent to
which the asserted right is affected, and the nature and strength of the asserted right. Hochman, supra
note 84, at 697. This test was employed in Hiddleston v. Nebraska Jewish Educ. Soc'y, 186 Neb. 786,
186 N.W.2d 904, 906 (1971).
86. See infra notes 87-90, 100 and accompanying text. See also Hochman, supra note 84, at
698-711, 724-26 (discussing several such categories); Slawson, supra note 85, at 238-44. See
generally S. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CoNsTrrrIoNAL LAw 471-72 (2d ed. 1983).
87. See Hochman, supra note 84, at 698-701; see, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742,
reh'g denied, Pownall v. United States, 335 U.S. 836 (1948) (state of war justified government's
recapture of portions of contract prices). See generally S. NOWAK, R. RoTUNDA & J. YoUNG, supra note
86, at472.
88. See United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 297 (1981), and cases cited therein. See also
Hochman, supra note 84, at 706-11; Slawson, supra note 85, at 220-21.
89. See Daughters of Miriam Center for the Aged v. Mathews, 590 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1978). See
also Hochman, supra note 84, at 703-06; Slawson, supra note 85, at 238-43.
90. For example, courts are likely to find retroactive legislation that is curative or pertains to
taxation or emergency valid because the government interest is so strong. See supra notes 87-89 and
accompanying text. Where the private party's right amounts to a gratuity or a right to proceeds from a
penalty assessed against a third party, the first party's right is weak and courts are particularly likely to
find retroactive legislation valid. Hochman, supra note 84, at 724-26. Hochman cites the following
cases in which courts found legislation extinguishing rights to gratuities and penalties valid: Cummings
v. Deutsche Bank und Discontogesellschaft, 300 U.S. 115 (1937); Maryland ex. rel. Wash. County v.
Baltimore & 0. Ry. Co., 44 U.S. (3 How.) 534 (1845); Hochman, supra note 84, at 724-25. See also
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571,577 (1934) (Congress is free to withdraw a gratuity). The fact that
the party incurred no financial cost in the acquisition of the ight is the deciding factor. On the other
hand, where a private party has relied to his or her detriment upon the asserted right, his interest is
stronger and the legislation is more likely to be found invalid. See Pacific Mail S.S. Co. v. Joliffe, 69
U.S. (2 Wall.) 450 (1865) (reliance removes the right from the gratuity category); Larionoff v. United
States, 533 F2d 1167, 1189-90 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1976), aff'd, 431 U.S. 864 (1977).
The tests themselves involve a balancing between the private party's interest and the public interest
served by the retroactive legislation. The detrimental reliance test, supra note 85, is a method for
assessing the weight of the private party's interest. Hochman's three-pronged test, supra note 85,
explicitly involves a balancing between the private party's rights and the public interest.
91. Patiex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 602 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Summit Nursing Home v.
United States, 572 F2d 737,743 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Daughters of Miriam Center for the Aged v. Mathews,
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to uphold retroactive legislation when the private party's interests are not
great or when the private party has not detrimentally relied upon the grant
of the extinguished right.92
The public interest served by a retroactive abolition of the farmer's
contract rights would simply be the savings from avoiding liability for a
non-Title II use of the grain. This interest is distinct from the public interest
served by the non-Title II use, such as increasing export sales or improving
domestic nutrition programs. The public interest in saving money should
not be strong enough to outweigh the interests of the private party who
relied on the abrogated right. 93
The fifth amendment requires the payment of just compensation for the
extinction of a property interest by unconstitutional retroactive legisla-
tion.94 Under this analysis, any such action by the legislature that would
destroy the future interest would require the government to pay the farmer.
However, the state courts are split over whether the interest in a possibility
of reverter is great enough to entitle the holder to compensation when the
interest is abrogated by subsequent legislation. 95 In Mercado v. Feliciano,
the only federal case dealing with the retroactive abolition of a possiblity of
reverter, the First Circuit held that the holder of the possiblity of reverter
was not entitled to compensation. 96 Mercado involved an act of the Puerto
Rico legislature which abolished an old Spanish statute that was in effect
before the island became a United States possession. The court held that the
act retroactively extinguished possibilities of reverter created under the
Spanish statute and that the holders' future interests were too speculative to
entitle them to compensation. 97
590 F.2d 1250, 1260 n.27 (3d Cir. 1978); Adams Nursing Home v. Mathews, 548 F.2d 1077, 1080 (1st
Cir. 1977); Arlington Hosp. v. Schweiker, 547 F. Supp. 670, 675 (E.D. Va. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 731 F.2d 171 (4th Cir. 1984).
92. See Hochman, supra note 84; supra note 90.
93. See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
94. See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470 (1973); United
States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, reh'g denied, 339 U.S. 950 (1950); United States
v. Rock Royal Co-op., 26 F. Supp. 534 (D.C.N.Y. 1939), modified on other grounds, 307 U.S. 533
(1939).
95. Several states courts have had the occasion to consider the effect of legislation that limits the
life of a possibility of reverter to a specified number of years from the date of its creation. Some states
found the retroactive legislation validly extinguished reverters which had been in existence longer than
the given number of years even as against claims under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See, e.g., Hiddleston v. Nebraska Jewish Educ. Soc'y, 186 Neb. 786, 186 N.W.2d 904,
907 (1971) (statute limiting validity of possibilities of reverter to 30 years after creation validly
extinguished reverters more than 30 years old); Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6111. 2d 486, 130 N.E.2d
111, 115 (1955) (same, with respect to a 50-year statute). Other state courts found similar statutes invalid.
See, e.g., Board ofEduc. v. Miles, 15 N.Y.2d 364,372,207 N.E.2d 181,186 (1965); Biltmore Village,
Inc. v. Royal Biltmore Village, Inc., 71 So.2d 727, 728-29 (Fla. 1954).
96. 260 F.2d 500 (1st Cir. 1958).
97. Id. at 504.
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However, it is likely that a court would compensate the farmer for a
congressional abolition of the farmer's possibility of reverter. First, unlike
the reverters considered in Mercado and the state cases, the farmer's
possibility of reverter would be relatively new.98 Second, the court would
also be likely to find the terminating event imminent since it is implausible
that Congress would consider retroactive legislation unless it was also
considering a nonfood aid use of the reserve.99 The farmer's interest in the
possibility of reverter would then not be merely speculative; courts could
find that such an interest outweighs the public interest in savings served by
the retroactive legislation. Third, courts are particularly reluctant to allow
alteration of the rights of a private party in a government contract.100
Mercado and the state cases, then, are also distinguishable because they did
not involve government contracts. Finally, some state courts have even held
that retroactive abrogation'of a possibility of reverter is always unconstitu-
tional, requiring the government to pay compensation. 101 This constitu-
tional uncertainty, coupled with the likelihood that courts would require
compensation, and the hostility that retroactive legislation would foster in
98. The farmer's possibility of reverter could never have a longer life than the storage life of wheat.
Because old wheat is removed from the reserve and new wheat added to replace it, 7 U.S.C.
§ 1736f-l(e) (1982), any particular farmer's wheat will be removed before the storage life of that wheat
expires. Such removal will not terminate the fee simple determinable and trigger the remedy; the
proposed legislation provides for such removal. Only unauthorized release from the reserve will make
the reverter possessory, so that once the wheat is released through § 1736f-l(e), a non-Title II use is
impossible. See Appendix, subsection (b)(3)(A) (future interest alternative).
99. Congress would probably be reluctant to pass retroactive legislation for reasons less pressing
than an imminent nonfood aid use since such legislation would provoke a hostile reaction from the
agricultural community.
100. Courts are particularly sensitive about allowing Congress to alter contracts to which the
government is a party because of the private party's detrimental reliance. Hochman, supra note 84, at
722-23; Slawson, supra note 85, at 243-44. See generally S. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra
note 86, at 476-77. The leading case in this area is Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934). Lynch
involved legislation which terminated life insurance proceeds owed to World War I veterans under a
federal program. The Court held that the legislation abolished a contract right and was unconstitutional;
the beneficiary was entitled to compensation for the extinguished property right even though the
detrimental reliance in Lynch was not significant, the premiums were small, and the Court characterized
the program as "benevolent." Lynch, 292 U.S. at 576. Lynch cannot be distinguished from the farmer's
case on the grounds that the reliance in Lynch was greater. For more recent cases, see Larionoff v.
United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1976), aff'd, 431 U.S. 864 (1977); Delaware River
Port Authority v. Tiemann, 403 F. Supp. 1117, 1138 n.63 (D.N.J. 1975).
This line of cases should be distinguished from those cases in which a gratuity or right to proceeds
from a penalty was granted the nongovernment party. See supra note 90. In those cases, the parties,
unlike the farmers, neither gave adequate consideration in return for nor relied upon the asserted right.
Under the proposed contracts, the government can be found to have induced the farmer's reliance
several ways. The government guarantee may induce the farmer to enter the contract. Because the
agricultural community is anxious about releases of the reserve, it may be more likely to sell wheat
'when a right to compensation is offered for unauthorized release. Furthermore, once the the contract is
entered into, the farmer may sell the possibility of reverter in reliance upon the proposed legislation.
101. See supra note 95.
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the agricultural community, would probably be enough to deter Congress
from repealing the future interest proposal. 102
The liquidated damages proposal would have less constitutional protec-
tion from subsequent repeal or amendment than would the future interest
proposal. Although courts would give much weight to the fact that the
liquidated damages proposal was part of a government contract with a
private party,103 one factor alters the analysis in favor of the retroactive
legislation. Since the farmer's right to receive the liquidated damages
would not have accrued at the time that Congress passes the retroactive
legislation, the court would be likely to hold that the retroactive legislation
is valid. 104 The farmer's interest in the possibility of reverter, on the other
hand, would have already "accrued" when retroactive legislation is
passed-the farmer retained a reversionary ownership' at the time of the
sale, whereas the right to the liquidated damages would accrue only when
the contract is breached by reason of a non-Title II use. In addition, a
possibility of reverter does not become more valuable only at the occurence
of the terminating event. It can also increase in value when the terminating
event becomes imminent. 105 The only event that could quicken the farmer's
right under the liquidated damages proposal is the government's breach.
The imminence of a breach cannot create the right to receive even a portion
of liquidated damages. This factor alone may not be enough to persuade a
court that retroactive legislation would be constitutional, especially when
that legislation alters rights in government contracts. However, a court
balancing the public interest served by the retroactive legislation against
the farmer's unaccrued right would be more likely to find the public interest
to prevail than in the case where the right had some present value.
102. The reasons for the agricultural community's hostility are discussed supra in notes 22, 26 and
accompanying text.
103. Courts are particularly reluctant to allow retrospective alterations of contracts between the
government and a private party. See supra note 100.
104. See Hochman, supra note 84, at 717. See also Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934)
(discussed supra note 100). In Lynch, the beneficiary's right to the insurance benefits had accrued
before passage of the retroactive legislation and was protected. 292 U.S. at 575. See also White v.
United States, 270 U.S. 175 (1926) (where right to receive benefits had not accrued, legislation
allowing another named beneficiary to take was valid). But see Mercado v. Feliciano, 260 F.2d 500 (1st
Cir. 1958) (possibility of reverter may be too speculative to warrant constitutional protection).
Hochman argues that although the Court has often validated legislation affecting accrued rights (an
exception is made for rights in government contracts; Hochman, supra note 84, at 722-24), the Court
may see no impediment to legislative abolition in cases where rights have not accrued. Hochman at 717.
105. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. Courts finding legislation which abolishes
reverters to be constitutional have relied on the fact that the reverters were a mere expectant interest and
of no present value. See, e.g., Hiddleston v. Nebraska Jewish Educ. Soc'y, 186 Neb. 786, 186 N.W.2d
904, 908 (1971).
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IV. COMPARISON OF PROPOSALS
The strength of the future interest proposal is its more certain constitu-
tional protection from subsequent congressional repeal. A subsequent
repeal would not necessarily extinguish the farmer's property interest.
Even if it did extinguish the future interest, the repeal might amount to a
taking and the farmer could invoke the constitutional protections of the fifth
amendment, requiring the government to compensate him. 106
The strength of the liquidated damages proposal is that the courts'
interpretation of the liquidated damages language in the contracts is more
predictable than its interpretation of the future interest language. A federal
common law of contracts has been developing for some time. 107 In contrast,
property law, especially in the area of future interests, is almost exclusively
handled by state courts. A federal court would have little federal precedent
to rely on and could be forced to fashion new common law in order to
interpret the statute. 108
The strength of the future interest proposal outweighs the strength of the
liquidated damages proposal. First, a subsequent repeal of the liquidated
damages legislation is potentially more dangerous than an unanticipated
interpretation of the property proposal. Subsequent legislation might com-
pletely extinguish the farmer's rights unless they were constitutionally
protected. Second, a subsequent repeal of legislation governing the liqui-
dated damages proposal is more likely than an interpretation of the future
interest proposal that is inconsistent with the concepts outlined in this
Comment. An inconsistent interpretation is only possible where the stat-
utory language is not clear. So long as the statute itself is clear and precise,
the courts would have little occasion to turn to other law in order to interpret
it. However, should questions of interpretation arise, federal borrowing of
state property law should result in sufficiently predictable federal decisions
involving the future interest proposal. 109 The future interest proposal, then,
is superior in terms of enduring success.
V. CONCLUSION
It is possible, under the American legal system, to provide a scheme for
insulating the Food Security Wheat Reserve from uses which would
threaten global food security. The best method would be to amend the Food
Security Wheat Reserve Act of 1980 to allow farmers to sell under contract
106. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
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to the government a fee simple determinable title to grain intended for the
reserve. The farmer would retain a future interest which would become pos-
sessory once the government used the grain for purposes other than food aid
or disposal pursuant to the normal replenishment procedures. The farmer
would still be entitled to compensation even if the government condemned
the future interest or the statute was subsequently amended or repealed.
Alternatively, the statute could be amended to require a liquidated
damages contract clause which would penalize the government for a non-
food aid diposal of the grain. This method, however, would not provide as
much security against non-food aid use of the wheat as the future interest
proposal since the contract remedy does not have as much constitutional
protection from subsequent repeal of the statute.
The United States has a unique responsibility to ensure food security for
the rest of the world. 110 The amendments proposed in this Comment would
enhance food security and would result in cost to the United States only in
situations where it reneged on its commitment to hold the Food Security
Wheat Reserve solely for purposes of urgent humanitarian relief. The
legislation would also protect the American farmer from losses caused by
illegitimate uses of the reserve. In the interest of global food security and
the American farmer, Congress is urged to consider these proposals.
Ann Marie Neugebauer
110. The United States' role as breadbasket of the world has grown increasingly important. The
United States produces a significant portion of the world's grain supply, Note, supra note 5, at 742-46,
and hence has an obligation to distribute that grain to help feed the rest of the world. See Walczak, supra
note 5, at 544.
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
Following is the text of the Food Security Wheat Reserve Act of 1980, 7
U.S.C. § 1736f-1 (Supp. 1980), as modified by the reauthorizing legisla-
tion, the Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1456
(1985). The proposed amendments are included and are underscored.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT BY PRESIDENT
To provide for a wheat reserve solely for emergency humanitarian food
needs-in developing countries, the President shall establish a reserve stock
of wheat of up to four million metric tons for use for the purposes specified
in subsection (c) of this section.
(b) INITIAL ESTABLISHMENT BY DESIGNATION OF WHEAT
OWNED BY COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION;
REPLENISHMENT BY PURCHASE OR BY DESIGNATION OF
WHEAT ACQUIRED BY CORPORATION
(1) The reserve stock of wheat under this section shall be established
initially by designation for that purpose by the Secretary of Agriculture of
wheat owned by the Commodity Credit Corporation.
(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (i) of this section, stocks of
wheat to replenish the reserve may be acquired (A) through purchases from
producers or in the market if the Secretary of Agriculture determines that
such purchases will not unduly disrupt the market, and (B) by designation
by the Secretary of stocks of wheat otherwise acquired by the Commodity
Credit Corporation. The sales contracts for wheat purchased from pro-
ducers or in the market must conform with the provisions of subsection
(b)(3) of this section. Whenever the governmentmakes purchases of wheat
from producers or in the market, it shall first purchase for the reserve, if a
need for replenishment exists at that time, except if the Secretary of
Agriculture determines such purchases would unduly disrupt the market.
Any use of funds to acquire wheat through purchases from producers or in
the market to replenish the reserve must be authorized in appropriation
Acts. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the federal government
shall be liable in accordance with the provisions in such contracts.
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[FUTURE INTEREST ALTERNATIVE]
(3) Sales contracts for wheat, as required by subsection (b)(2) of this
section, shall:
(A) convey title to the wheat in fee simple determinable to the government,
which title is possessory so long as the wheat is not released from the reserve
for purposes other than management of stocks under subsection (e) of this
section or donation under Title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954 [7 U.S.C. § 1721 et seq.] in subsections (c) and (d) of
this section, but which title shall revert to the vendor automatically if the
wheat is used for purposes other than those mentioned above; and
(B) provide that the value of the possibility of reverter, upon breach of the
condition in subection (3)(A) of this section, shall be equal to the market
value of the wheat disposed of, determined by the quoted price of that grade of
wheat on the Chicago Board of Trade on the date of original purchase or the
date of disposition, whichever is higher; and
(C) provide that if the government both condemns the possibility of reverter
and breaches the condition in subsection (3)(A) of this section, the vendor
shall be entitled to compensation, the value of which shall be equal to the
market value of the disposed wheat, determined by the quoted price of that
grade of wheat on the Chicago Board of Trade on the date of original
purchase, condemnation, or disposition, whichever is higher.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of law:
(A) a future interest can be validly created in wheat for the purposes of such
contracts; and
(B) the possibilities of reverter shall attach to the proceeds of any sale and
not to the wheat disbursed, but if there exist no proceeds, it shall attach to
Commodity Credit Corporation assets; and
(C) for the purposes of identifying interest in the wheat, wheat acquired
through the sales contracts shall be disposed of in a first-in, first-out basis,
except that where the release is in accordance with subsection (c) or (e) of this
section, wheat acquired from the Commodity Credit Corporation shall be
deemed to be released first. Wheat in the reserve which was acquired from the
Commodity Credit Corporation shall be disposed of last where the disposal is
a breach of the condition in subsection (b)(3)(A) of this section.
[LIQUIDATED DAMAGES ALTERNATIVE]
(3) sales contracts for wheat, as required by subsection (B)(2) of this
section, shall:
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(A) provide that the government shall have breached the contract by
releasing the wheat for purposes other than management oT stocks under
subsection (e) of this section or donation under title II of the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 [7 U.S.C. § 1721 et seq.] as
provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section; and
(B) provide for liquidated damages amounting to the market value of the
wheat disposed of to be paid to the vendor upon such breach, which value
shall be equal to the market value of the disposed wheat, determined by the
quoted price of that grade of wheat on the Chicago Board of Trade on the date
of original purchase, condemnation, or disposition, whichever is higher; and
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
(A) the liquidated damages in subsection (b)(3)(A) of this section are
enforceable; and
(B) the vendor may assign his contract rights; and
(C) for the purposes of identifying interest in the wheat, wheat acquired
through such contracts shall be disposed of in a first-in, first-out basis, except
that where the release is in accordance with subsection (c) or (e) of this
section, wheat acquired from the Commodity Credit Corporation shall be
deemed to be released first. Wheat in the reserve which was acquired from the
Commodity Credit Corporation shall be disposed of last where the disposal is
a breach of the condition in subsection (b)(3)(A) of this section.
(c) RELEASE OF WHEAT STOCKS BY PRESIDENT FOR
EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, stocks of wheat designated
or acquired for the reserve under this section may be released by the
President to provide, on a donation or sale basis, emergency food as-
sistance to developing countries at any time that the domestic supply of
wheat is so limited that quantities of wheat cannot be made available for
disposition under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
of 1954 [7 U.S.C.A. § 1691 et seq.], except for urgent humanitarian
purposes, under the criteria of section 401(a) of that Act [7 U.S.C.A.
§ 173 1(a)]. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding sentence, up
to three hundred thousand metric tons of wheat may be released from the
reserve under this section in any fiscal year, without regard to the domestic
supply situation, for use under Title II of the Agricultural Trade Develop-
ment and Assistance Act of 1954 [7 U.S.C.A. § 1721 et seq.] in providing
urgent humanitarian relief in any developing country suffering a major
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disaster, as determined by the President, whenever the wheat needed for
relief cannot be programed for such purpose in a timely manner under the
normal means of obtaining commodities for food assistance due to circum-
stances of unanticipated and exceptional need. Wheat released from the
reserve may be processed in the United States and shipped to a developing
country in the form of flour when conditions in the recipient country require
such processing in the United States.
(d) RELEASE OF WHEAT TO MEET FAMINE OR OTHER RELIEF
REQUIREMENTS
Wheat released from the reserve for the purposes of subsection (c) of this
section shall be made available under the Agricultural Trade Development
and Assistance Act of 1954 [7 U.S.C.A. § 1691 et seq.] to meet famine or
other urgent or extraordinary relief requirements, except that section
401(a) of that Act [7 U.S.C. A. § 173 1(a)], with respect to determinations
of availability, shall not be applicable thereto.
(e) MANAGEMENT OF WHEAT IN RESERVE TO AVOID
SPOILAGE
The Secretary of Agriculture shall provide for the management of stocks
of wheat in the reserve as to location and class of wheat needed to meet
emergency situations and for the periodic rotation of stocks of wheat in the
reserve to avoid spoilage and deterioration of such stocks, using programs
authorized by the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954 [7 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq.] and any other provision of law, but any
quantity of wheat removed from the reserve for the purposes of this
subsection shall be promptly replaced with an equivalent quantity of
wheat, subject to the provisions of subsection (b)(2) of this section.
(f) WHEAT IN RESERVE AS PART OF TOTAL DOMESTIC
SUPPLY FOR PURPOSES OF OTHER LAWS
Stocks of wheat in the reserve shall not be considered a part of the total
domestic supply (including carryover) for the purposes of subsection (c) of
this section or for the purposes of administering the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954 [7 U.S.C.A. § 1691 et seq.] and
shall not be subject to any quantitative limitations on exports that may be
imposed under section 2406 of the Appendix to Title 50.
Vol. 61:597, 1986
Food Security
(g) USE OF COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION FUNDS,
FACILITIES, AND AUTHORITIES; REIMBURSEMENT OF
CORPORATION
(1) The funds, facilities, and authorities of the Commodity Credit
Corporation shall be used by the Secretary of Agriculture in carrying out
this section, except that any restriction applicable to the acquisition,
storage, or disposition of Commodity Credit Corporation owned or con-
trolled commodities shall not apply with respect to the acquisition, storage,
or disposal of wheat for or in the reserve.
(2) Effective beginning October 1, 1981, the Commodity Credit Corpo-
ration shall be reimbursed from funds made available for carrying out the
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 [7 U.S.C.A.
§ 1691 et seq.] for wheat released from the reserve that is made available
under such Act, such reimbursement to be made on the basis of actual costs
incurred by the Commodity Credit Corporation with respect to such wheat
or the export market price of wheat (as determined by the Secretary) as of
the time the wheat is released from the reserve for such purpose, whichever
is lower. Such reimbursement may be made from funds appropriated for
that purpose in subsequent years.
(h) FINALITY OF DETERMINATIONS BY PRESIDENT OR
SECRETARY
Any determination by the President or the Secretary of Agriculture
under this section shall be final.
(i) EXPIRATION OF AUTHORITY TO REPLENISH STOCKS OF
WHEAT; DISPOSAL OF REMAINING STOCKS
The authority to replace stocks of wheat to maintain the reserve under
this section shall expire September 30, 1990, after which stocks released
from the reserve may not be replenished. Stocks of wheat remaining in the
reserve after September 30, 1990, shall be disposed of by release for use in
providing for emergency food needs in developing countries as provided in
this section.
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